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1 Introduction
The effect of savings on capital accumulation and growth has always been one of the
fundamental research topics in economics. According to Smith (1776), increased di-
vision of labor raises productivity, but savings govern capital accumulation, which
enables production growth. In the 18th century, only rich people saved. Therefore,
economic growth was possible only when there were enough rich people in the so-
ciety. However, according to Keynes (1936), inequality of income would slow down
economic growth. Keynes argued that marginal consumption decreases as the income
of an individual increases, and thus, aggregate consumption depends on changes in ag-
gregate income. Because demand is the basis of investments, and because inequality
lowers aggregate consumption, inequality of income would diminish economic growth.
In neo-classical growth models, income distribution determines the level savings and
thus the level of capital accumulation (Solow 1956; Kaldor 1957).
In addition to the approach of classical economics, there exist several theories de-
scribing the effect of income inequality on savings and consumption. These include
the permanent income hypothesis by Friedman (1957), life-cycle hypothesis by Ando
and Modigliani (1963), which was augmented with intergenerational transfers by Kot-
likoff and Summers (1981), savings under liquidity constraints by Deaton (1991), and
political-economy models (e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1994)).
Although theoretical research spans several decades, the effect of income inequality
on savings remains an open empirical issue. This is due to the fact that empirical cross-
country studies have produced controversial results on the effect of income inequality
on savings. In one of the most recent panel econometric studies, Leigh and Posso
(2009) estimate the effect of the income share of the top 1% on the percentage value
of gross savings of the GDP and find no statistically significant effect of inequality on
national savings. Similarly, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) find no statistically
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significant effect of the percentage value of savings of the GDP using several different
measures of income inequality. However, Smith (2001) finds that inequality, measured
with Deininger and Squire’s (1996) Gini index, has a statistically robust positive effect
on the percentage value of savings of the GDP. Cook (1995) finds the same effect in less
developed economies. Li and Zou (2004) find that inequality has a negative effect on
private savings using Deininger and Squire’s (1996) Gini index and the ratio of private
savings of GDP.
All the empirical studies summarized above have assumed that income inequality,
measured either by the Gini index or by the share of income earned by different in-
come classes, is a stationary variable. However, in the early theoretical literature on
income inequality, the income variation was assumed to be driven by a stochastic pro-
cess (Chambernowne 1953; Mandelbrot 1961). Moreover, Mandelbrot (1961) argued
that time-independent, i.e. stationary, income variations are unlikely, and it is possible
that the distribution of income will never reach a steady state implying a nonstationary
process of income variation. In a recent study with cross-country panel data, Malinen
(2011) and Herzer and Vollmer (2011) have obtained results according to which the
data generating process of income inequality would be driven by a stochastic trend,
indicating that inequality would be an I(1) nonstationary variable. Previously, for ex-
ample, Mocan (1999) has obtained similar results.1 If this assumption of the early
theoretical models held in general, it would offer an explanation to the controversy in
the previous empirical studies. This is because regressing a stationary variable on an
I(1) variable(s) can lead to a spurious regression (Stewart 2011). In empirical studies,
savings is usually measured as a percentage of the GDP. If both logarithmic savings
and the logarithmic GDP are I(1) variables and cointegrated, their difference results,
by construction, in a stationary variable, namely savings as a percentage of the GDP.
Thus, if inequality were an I(1) variable and savings as a ratio of the GDP a stationary
1See also Jäntti and Jenkins (2010).
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I(0) variable, regressing savings on inequality would give spurious results.
This study uses panel cointegration methods to test the time series properties of
the included variables and to estimate the (possible) long-run relation between income
inequality and savings. We use data on nine developed economies, and spanning four
decades starting from the year 1960. The income share of the top 1%, used to proxy the
distribution of income, has been found to track broader measures of income inequal-
ity, like the Gini index, very well (Leigh 2007). According to panel unit root tests,
the logarithmic income share of the top 1%, logarithmic gross national savings and
logarithmic private consumption are all I(1) nonstationary variables. Income share of
the top 1% is also found to be cointegrated with private consumption, which implies
that there is a long-run dependency relation between them. The effect of inequality
on private consumption is found to be negative in the Nordic and Central-European
countries, but for the Anglo-Saxon countries the direction of the effect (positive vs.
negative) remains somewhat ambiguous. The results of the panel cointegration tests
are inconclusive on possible cointegration between gross savings and the top 1% in-
come share. The real GDP per capita and gross savings as well as the real GDP per
capita and private consumption are also found to be cointegrated. This implies that
the ratios of savings and private consumption to GDP would be stationary variables
and hence previous research is likely to have produced biased results on the effect of
inequality on savings and consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the theoretical and
empirical background of the study. Section 3 describes the data and presents the results
of unit root tests. Section 4 reports the results of cointegration tests and section 5 gives
the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
3
2 Theoretical and empirical considerations
Several theories have been constructed to explain the effect of inequality on savings.
In classical economic theory, the form of the individual saving function determines the
effect of income inequality on savings. When the saving function is linear or concave,
the distribution of income and wealth converge toward equality as the economy grows
(Stiglitz 1969). If the saving function is convex, the marginal propensity to save in-
creases with income. According to the permanent income hypothesis, individuals with
low income have higher propensity to consume, and small changes in income, or its
distribution, do not affect the consumption decisions of households (Friedman 1957).
The life-cycle hypothesis argues that, if bequests are luxury, the saving rate should
be higher among wealthier individuals (Kotlikoff and Summers 1981). In political-
economy models, more unequal income distribution may create demand for more re-
distribution through taxation and income transfers, and if the saving function of indi-
viduals in the economy is convex, i.e. the rich save more, this will diminish aggregate
savings through diminished incomes of the rich (Alesina and Perotti 1994).
What is common to all of the theories introduced above is that they generally as-
sume that the individual income process is non-stochastic. However, as pointed out by
Stiglitz (1969), the very first (formal) models of income inequality by Chambernowne
(1953) and Mandelbrot (1961) were based on stochastic processes. Chambernowne
(1953) developed a model assuming that the evolution of income of an individual is
determined by his/her income in the previous year and by a stochastic (chance) pro-
cess. In modern terms, this process would be said to be I(1) non-stationary.
I(1) non-stationary processes have a infinite memory, i.e., they are highly persis-
tent. Assuming some degree of persistence in the evolution of the income series of an
individual is quite intuitive as shocks (e.g., wage raise) to the income process of an
individual are likely to have permanent effects on the future incomes of the individual.
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Microeconomic literature on household income and consumption behavior adopted the
idea of permanent effects affecting the income series of an individual. For instance,
Hall and Mishkin (1982) considered a stochastic model of consumption proposed by
Muth (1960), where the effect of individual income on consumption was divided into
permanent and transitory components. In a recent study on the evolution of consump-
tion and income inequality, Blundell et al. (2008) use the same kind of formulation
where the income of households varies according to the following function:
logYit = Zitϑt +Pit + vit, (1)
where Zit is a set of income characteristics of household i that are observable and known
by consumers at time t,2 vit follows an MA(q) process, and Pi,t = Pi,t−1 +it with it seri-
ally uncorrelated, indicating that the process {P} is I(1) non-stationary. Several studies
in the micro literature tend to find that also empirically the permanent component Pit is
a random walk, and hence it can be modeled as an I(1) nonstationary process (Meghir
and Pistaferri 2004; Hall and Mishkin 1982; Blundell et al. 2008).
Deaton (1991) studied how liquidity constraints affect national savings, when in-
comes are driven by a random walk with drift.3 He argued that the assumption of
optimal intertemporal consumption behavior of consumers being restricted by borrow-
ing constraints would help to create a model that could explain the observed patterns of
household wealth and the dependency of consumption on income during the life cycle
of an individual. According to Deaton, the problem with stochastic life cycle - perma-
nent income models, like the model by Hall and Mishkin (1982), is that they assume
substantial wealth accumulation at some point of the life cycle of an individual, which
was not supported by the data. Deaton assumed that the labor income of an individual
2These include demographic, education, employment status, ethnic, etc. factors (Blundell et al. 2008)
3Assuming a drift in income relation is intuitive and necessary, because income tends to grow over time.
Thus, just variations around that trend are assumed to be stochastic.
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follows an AR(1) process of the form:
log(yt+1) = log(yt) + log(zt+1) +δ, (2)
where yt is labor income, zt+1 is stochastic random variable, and δ > 0 is a constant.
When zt+1 is assumed to be identically and independently distributed, the labor income
process, log(yt), is I(1) non-stationary and, specifically, it follows a random walk with
drift. Deaton found that, when income is a random walk and borrowing constraints are
binding, it is undesirable for households to undertake any smoothing of consumption,
i.e., they have no incentives to save. This implies that consumption equals income
on all income levels. However, he assumed that the interest rate is higher than the
consumer’s discount rate. If the interest rate equals the consumer’s discount rate, the
stochastic income process and borrowing constraints lead to the result that the propen-
sity to consume is lower at higher income levels (Seater 1997; Travaglini 2008). In this
day and age, the debate on the validity of the life cycle - permanent income hypothe-
sis is still very much ongoing. In a recent paper, Attanasio and Weber (2010) review
the literature on intertemporal allocation models and present some modifications to the
standard life cycle hypothesis framework to make the model fit the micro data better.
When individual income series are affected by a random walk component, the ag-
gregated time series is likely to be characterized by a random walk (Rossanan and
Seater 1995). This applies to the aggregate income, but the distribution of income is
often measured using some bounded measure, like the Gini index or share of total in-
come. This changes things a bit as any measure that varies within some boundaries
like the income share, cannot, by definition, be an I(1) nonstationary process. This
is because the variance of such an series cannot grow to infinity with time which is
what happens with random walk series. However, it is possible that the distribution
can have a stochastic trend in its other moments, like the mean, skewness, and kurtosis,
than variance (White and Granger 2010). Thus, when individual income series that are
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affected by a random walk component are aggregated to a bounded distribution, it is
likely that this distribution has a stochastic trend in its kurtosis and/or in its skewness.
This way the measure of income inequality, being a functional of some income distri-
bution, may exhibit such high levels of persistence that it is better approximated by an
I(1) process than a stationary process.
Thus, the possibility that income inequality is driven by a stochastic trend needs
to be taken into account in the analysis of the relationship between inequality and
savings. Especially in empirical analysis, this is quite crucial, as the possible I(1)
non-stationarity of the included variables determines the way this relationship can be
consistently estimated (see the Introduction). That is why we next turn to testing the
time series properties of relevant variables.
3 Data and unit root tests
3.1 Data
In this study we use the the top 1% income share of population to proxy the income
distribution in different countries. Since the work of Piketty (2003), there has been a
growing interest towards building long time series of the evolution of top income shares
of the population. Measuring the developments in top income shares makes it possible
to construct substantially longer time series from the evolution of the distribution of
income than would be possible using the Gini index or similar aggregate measures. Top
income series are built using national tax data and applying the same method across
countries to make the series comparable (Atkinson and Piketty 2007). Leigh (2007)
has also demonstrated that the top 1% income share series have a high correlation with
other measures of income inequality, like the Gini index. The dataset on the top 1%
income shares gathered by Leigh is a primary source of data in this study.
However, after Leigh (2007) there have been additions to the pool of countries
for which a historical dataset of the evolution of top incomes is available. Roine and
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Waldenström (2011) have used data collected from several different sources in their
analysis of common trends and shocks in top income series. Their dataset is extensive,
but it, like the dataset by Leigh (2007), has one caveat. Due to the length of some series
(starting from the beginning of the 20 century) the observations from all countries are
not continuous, and thus they are forced to extrapolate over some observations. This
is problematic, because extrapolation of over just one observation may alter the time
series properties of the observed variable. From the dataset of Leigh we know that
the series of New Zealand has observations missing in 1961, 1974, and 1976. Thus,
New Zealand is not included in the datasets that consists of those periods. For the
other countries neither Leigh nor Roine and Waldenström explicitly list the observa-
tions over which they are extrapolating, and thus we have to check the original data
sources to find out about the location of the missing observations. After observing the
individual sources of data, we include nine countries in our baseline dataset. These
countries are: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.4 All these countries have
continuous observations from the year 1960 onwards, except Switzerland from which
we have only bi-annual average observations (Dell et al. 2010). That is, for example,
in 1995 and in 1996 the value corresponds to the average share of the top 1% income
during 1995-1996. Thus, we do not include Switzerland on any of the unit root tests,
but observations from Switzerland are included in the cointegration testing and estima-
tions. Because of the restrictions imposed by some of our testing methods explained
later, the nine countries are divided into three groups of countries according to their
(assumed) economic models. The groups are: Nordic, Central-European, and Anglo-
4The problematic countries in this dataset are Finland and the Netherlands. In Finland’s case the original
data, allegedly spanning from 1920 to 2005, could not be checked, but we could check that the data is
continuous at least from 1966 onwards. For the Netherlands there are direct observations only from the
year 1977 onward and significant part of the previous observations are a result of interpolation and pure
estimation. However, panel unit root tests are done also without Nordic countries and the Netherlands, and
because extrapolation would have the biggest impact on those tests, the bias created by possible extrapolation
over some values of top 1% series in Finland and the Netherlands is diminished.
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Saxon countries.5 In addition, Japan and New Zealand are included in the testing for
the time series properties of the top 1% income share data.
The endogenous variables used in this study are the gross savings and the private
consumption expenditures. The data on these is obtained from the AMECO database
compiled and published by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
of the European Comission. AMECO is used, because it has more extensive time se-
ries coverage on the variables in question than, for example, the dataset of World Bank.
AMECO does not include data on private savings, but because private consumption is
the mirror image of private savings, it should not make any difference which of these
two variables is used. Both variables are measured in aggregate terms to minimize the
effects that a third variable might have on the relation between inequality and savings.
Changes, for example, in fertility may have an effect on variables that are measured
in per capita terms without affecting the income share of the top 1%. Thus, express-
ing gross savings and private consumption in per capita terms could add stochastic
elements to the time series of those variables unrelated to their relation with income
inequality.
The other variables included in the estimation are the real gross domestic product
per capita, the dependency rate, and the interest rate. The real GDP per capita is histor-
ically thought to proxy the expected lifetime wealth of the residents in a country (Cook
1995). The level of national income may also have a direct effect on gross savings and
consumption. The dependency rate is used to control for possible changes in the saving
patterns across the life cycle of individuals, and it measures the ratio of the population
under 15 to that over 64 years of age. Interest rates may affect the individual propensity
to save by affecting the profitability of saving. The year 1960 is the first year included
in the dataset but the last year varies from one country to another. The data on depen-
5Canada, United Kingdom and Unites States are included in the Anglo-Saxon group. France, Nether-
lands, and Switzerland are included in the Central-European group, and Finland, Norway, and Sweden are
included in the group of Nordic countries.
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dency is obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank and the
data on interest rates is from the database of the International Monetary Fund.
The data on interest rates varies a little across countries in the dataset. The baseline
rate is the discount or the bank rate, i.e. the rate at which central banks lend to deposit
banks. However, for some countries, observations of this variable are not available
for the whole time period. That is why there are some differences in the indicators
of interest rates between the groups of countries. For Finland, Sweden, Norway, and
Switzerland, the central bank rate is used. For Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
USA, the treasury bill rate is used, which gives the rate at which short-term securities
are issued or traded in the market. For France and the Netherlands, the money market
rate is used, which gives the rate on short term lending between financial institutions.
Although using different indicators of interest rates is not optimal, all these indicators
should reflect changes in the interest rate at which consumers borrow from and deposit
money to banks.
3.2 Unit root tests
To test for possible unit roots, four different panel unit root tests are used. The first two
are the so called traditional and the last two the so called second generation panel unit
root tests. Traditional panel unit root tests do not allow for cross-sectional dependency
while the second generation tests allow for cross-sectional correlation.
The traditional panel unit root tests, by Im et al. (2003) and the panel version of the
ADF test by Maddala and Wu (1999), are based on the following regression:
4yit = ρiyi,t−1 +ηit+αt + θt + it, (3)
where αi are individual constants, ηit are individual time trends, and θt are the com-
mon time effects. The tests rely on the assumption that E[it js] = 0 ∀ t, s and i , j,
which is required for calculating common time effects. Thus, if the different series are
10
correlated, the last assumption is violated.
The second generation tests by Pesaran (2007) and Phillips and Sul (2003) are
based on the regression
4yit = ρyi,t−1 +ηit+αi +δiθt + it, (4)
where αis are the individual constants, ηit are the individual time trends, and θt is the
common time effect, whose coefficients, δi, are assumed to be non-stochastic, measure
the impact of the common time effects of series i, and it is assumed to be normally
distributed with mean zero and covariance of σ2 and independent of  js and θs for all
i , j and s, t. Cross-sectional dependence is allowed through the common time effect,
which generates the correlation between cross-sectional units. The matrix δi gives the
non-random factor loading coefficients that determine the extent of the cross-sectional
correlation. The null hypothesis in all tests is that ρi = 0 ∀ i. The alternative hypotheses
are:
H1 : ρi < 0, i = 1,2, ...,N1, ρi = 0, i = N1 + 1,N1 + 2, ...,N. (5)
For consistency of panel unit root tests it is also required that, under the alterna-
tive, the fraction of the individual processes that are stationary is non-zero, formally
limN→∞(N1/N) = γ, 0 < γ ≤ 1 (Im et al. 2003).
Table 1 presents the results of the four panel unit root tests for the top 1% income
share. The tests have been applied to three different datasets. The first includes the
data on five countries with the longest continuous time series in the dataset by Leigh
(2007).6 The second dataset includes the eight countries on which we have data for all
the included variables excluding Switzerland. The third dataset includes observations
from seven countries excluding the Nordic countries. This dataset spans from 1983 to
6Countries included in the test are: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and the USA. All these countries
should have continuous observations throughout the period.
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2002.7 The third dataset is used, because, according to Roine and Waldenström (2011),
there is a trend break in the series of the top 1% income share in 1991 in the Nordic
countries. According to Roine and Waldenström (2011), there are similar trend breaks
in the top 1% income share series in the Anglo-Saxon countries, including Australia,
Canada, UK and USA (in 1982), in Central European countries, including France,
Switzerland, and Netherlands (in 1976), and in Asian countries, including Japan (in
1983). So, to make sure that the results of the panel unit root tests are not driven
by structural breaks, the tests are run using only those countries that should not have
breaks in their top 1% income share series in the test period. According to all tests in
Table 1: Panel unit root tests of the top 1% income share
variable period IPS ADF Pesaran PS
top 1% 1925-1998 3.449 2.270 -0.103 4.200
(0.998) (0.994) (0.459) (0.838)
top 1% 1960-1996 5.256 1.282 -0.348 3.212
(0.999) (0.998) (0.364) (0.976)
top 1% 1983-2002 -0.302 16.670 -0.198 16.636
(0.381) (0.273) (0.421) (0.187)
The tested equation is: 4yit = ρiyi,t−1 + δi + ηit+ θt + it . All variables are tested in logarithms. P-values of
the test statistics appear in parentheses. With the exception of the PS test, lag length was determined using
Schwarts information criterion (SIC). In PS test the lag length is selected with top-down method. The dataset
of 1925-1998 includes 6 countries and 444 observations, the dataset of 1960-1996 includes 9 countries and
333 observations, and the dataset of 1983-2002 includes 6 countries and 121 observations.
all datasets, the logarithmic top 1% income share is a I(1) nonstationary process. This
holds even in the last test, where the Nordic countries are excluded from the test to
control for the possible structural breaks present in their top 1% income share series.
Table 2 presents the results of panel unit root tests of the other variables. Because
gross savings is expressed in constant Euros and private consumption in purchasing
power parities (ppp), two different series of real GDP per capita series are included
in the dataset. According to all tests, gross savings, private consumption, the interest
rates, and both versions of the real GDP per capita are I(1) processes. With the ex-
7Countries included in the test are: Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the
USA.
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Table 2: Panel unit root tests of the other included variables, 1960-1996
variable IPS ADF Pesaran PS
gross savings 2.207 2.144 -0.186 4.79
(0.986) (0.999) (0.426) (1.000)
consumption 12.532 0.0645 0.221 7.53
(1.000) (1.000) (0.587) (0.960)
GDP, ppp 11.006 14.039 0.347 5.331
(1.000) (1.000) (0.636) (0.994)
GDP, eur 3.912 19.453 2.420 11.210
(1.000) (0.364) (0.992) (0.796)
dependency -5.077 82.382 1.005 50.92
(<.001) (<.001) (0.843) (<.001)
interest rate 0.717 13.937 -1.144 19.97
(0.764) (0.731) (0.126) (0.220)
The tested equation is: 4yit = ρiyi,t−1 + δi +ηit+ θt + it . All variables are in logarithms. Probabilities of the
test statistics appear in parentheses. In all other tests, except in the PS test, lag lengths were determined using
Schwarts information criterion (SIC). Testing includes 9 countries and 333 observations.
ception of the test by Pesaran (2007), all tests clearly reject the null hypothesis of the
nonstationarity of the dependency rate, indicating that it is a trend-stationary variable.
4 Cointegration tests
4.1 Testing with the whole data
The methods for testing for cointegration in panel data have developed very rapidly
during the first decade of the 21st century. One of the most commonly used cointegra-
tion testing methods has been the residual based panel cointegration test by Pedroni
(2004). The limitation of Pedroni’s test is that it assumes independence of cross-
sections, an assumption, which is likely to be violated in econometric cross-country
studies.8 Cross-sectional correlation may bias the results towards rejecting the null of
no cointegration (Banerjee et al. 2004). To account for this bias, we use a panel coin-
tegration test developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) that controls for
cross-sectional dependency by introducing common factors. The test also controls for
possible endogeneity of regressors by including leads and lags of differenced explana-
8There are, for example, only few countries that avoided the downturn of 2008 that started from the U.S.
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tory variables in estimation (this method is explained more thoroughly in the appendix
C explaining the panel DSUR estimator). A more thorough explanation of the test by
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) can also be found in the appendix A. The test is
based on two different test statistics, namely ZρˆNT (λˆ) and ZtˆNT (λˆ) to test for the possible
cointegration between two variables. Both statistics are based on the ADF regression,
from where the former uses the estimated coefficients of ρˆ and the latter the associated
t-ratio to compute the test statistic.
Table 3 presents the results of the panel cointegration test by Banerjee and Carrion-
i-Silvestre (2006). It reports the results of the cointegration tests between gross savings
and the top 1% income share and gross savings and the GDP per capita.9 In addition,
we test for cointegration between private consumption and the top 1% income share and
private consumption and GDP per capita. 10 According to the results of the ZtˆNT (λˆ) test
presented in table 3, gross savings and the income share of top 1% as well as private
consumption and top 1% income share are cointegrated at the 5% level. According
to the ZρˆNT (λˆ) test, only gross savings and the top 1% income share are cointegrated.
However, Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) note that the ZtˆNT (λˆ) statistic should
be preferred over the ZρˆNT (λˆ) statistic, because the former has considerably better size
and power properties especially in small samples. Thus, we rely more on the results of
the ZtˆNT (λˆ), and conclude that both gross savings and private consumption seem to be
cointegrated with the top 1% income share. The GDP per capita and gross savings as
well as GDP per capita and private consumption seem to be cointegrated of order 1.
Table 3 only presents the results of the test without breaks. However, we also con-
ducted tests with breaks, but if trend breaks are allowed for, the results do not change
dramatically. This is expected as structural breaks tend to bias the results towards the
acceptance of the null (Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre 2006). The results of the tests
9GDP per capita in Euros is used in the for gross savings as the gross savings series is also presented in
Euros. GDP per capita in ppp is used in the test for private savings for the same reason.
10Estimation is done with Gauss. We are grateful to Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing the program code.
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Table 3: Banerjee & Carrion-i-Silvestre’s cointegration test for gross savings, final
consumption and the income share of top 1%
gross savings private consumption
Top 1% income share
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -3.952 -2.255
(<.0001) (0.0121)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) -3.084 -0.548
(0.0010) (0.292)
GDP per capita
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -5.683 -5.494
(<.0001) (<.0001)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) -3.090 -6.399
(0.0010) (<.0001)
countries 9 9
years 1960-1996 1960-1996
observations 333 333
The tested model includes individual deterministic constants and trends.
including structural breaks are available upon request.
4.2 Testing for the cointegration rank
One of the obvious drawbacks of the residual tests, like the ones presented above, is
that they cannot identify the number of cointegrating vectors between the variables. If
we have just two variables, this is not a problem, because then there cannot be more
than one cointegrating vector. However, with three variables, there can be two cointe-
grating vectors, with four variables three cointegrating vectors, etc. The cointegration
rank affects estimators, because some estimators, like the panel DSUR estimator, are
based on the single equation approach meaning that a single cointegration relationship
is assumed. If there are two or more cointegration relationships between the variables,
the asymptotic properties of the estimators derived under the assumption of one coin-
tegration relation are no longer valid. In addition, estimators allowing for multiple
cointegrating vectors, like the estimator by Breitung (2005) used in this study, usually
assume that the cointegration rank is homogenous across the countries included in the
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panel.
To allow for multiple cointegrating vectors, we use the panel trace cointegration test
developed by Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) to test for the cointegration rank in models
involving several explanatory variables. Their test is based on the likelihood ratio test
of Johansen (1995). The general model on which Larsson ja Lyhagen’s test is based
can be written as
4Yit = µi +ΠYi,t−1 +Σm−1k=1 Γk∆Yi,t−k + it, (6)
where Π = αikβk j, Π and Γk are of order Np×Np and µi and it are of order Np×1, and
t = (′1t, 
′
2t, ..., 
′
nt) is assumed to be multivariate normally distributed with mean zero
and covariance matrix Ω.
It is assumed that matrix Π has a reduced rank of Nr, 0 ≤ r ≤ p, and can be de-
composed as Π = αikβ′k j. The matrix αik is assumed to be unrestricted, but βk j = 0
∀i , j. The fact that unrestricted αik means that different panel units can be dependent,
but because of the restriction on βk j, these dependency relations can only appear in the
short run. In other words, cointegrating relations are only allowed within the units of
the panel. The cointegration rank is estimated by sequentially testing
H(r) : rank(Π) ≤ Nr (7)
against the alternative
H(p) : rank(Π) ≤ Np (8)
as in Johansen (1995). A more detailed explanation of the test is provided in Appendix
??.
A limitation in the panel cointegration test by Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) is that
the number of estimated parameters increases rapidly with the number of cross sec-
tions. This means that there need to be enough time series observations compared to
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cross-sectional units or the parameters of the model cannot be estimated. In our base-
line dataset, there are nine countries and 37 time series observations per country, a
relation which is far too small for the test. That is why countries are divided into three
groups as explained in the section 3.1. Because countries in these groups tend to have
similar economic and social structures, it is more likely that they also have homogenous
cointegration relations.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the test for the cointegration rank by Larsson
and Lyhagen (2007) for the three groups of countries for gross savings and private
consumption as the dependent variable.11 All variables are detrended and demeaned
before testing. The VAR lag length was determined using the Schwartz information
criterion (SIC).
According to the results presented in table 4, the top 1% income share and gross
savings appear to be difference stationary variables in the Central European and Anglo-
Saxon countries. That is, both are I(1) variables that are not cointegrated. This result
contradicts the results presented in Table 3, where gross savings and the top 1% income
share were found to be cointegrated. The results of Nordic countries indicate that
there would be, at least, two cointegration vectors between top 1% income share and
gross savings. When the GDP per capita and the interest rate are added test finds a
cointegration rank of two in the Nordic countries.
According to results of table 5, private consumption and the top 1% income share
are cointegrated in the Central European and Anglo-Saxon countries. When the GDP
per capita and the interest rate are added, the test finds a cointegration rank of two in
the Anglo-Saxon countries and cointegration rank of three in the Nordic countries. In
the Central European countries only private consumption, the top 1% income share
and the GDP per capita were included in the testing, because there were not enough
11All testing is done by Gauss. We are grateful to Johan Lyhagen for providing the Gauss code on his
homepage.
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Table 4: Panel trace cointegration test for savings and the top 1% income share for the
3 country groups
Nordic Central-Europe* Anglo-Saxon**
top 1%
r=0 211.12 292.15 72.32
(197.64) (307.22) (92.86)
r≤ 1 57.52 - -
(50.71)
top 1%, GDP & interest
r=0 469.50 - -
(381.22)
r≤1 301.53 - -
(283.40)
r≤2 186.47 - -
(175.66)
r≤3 113.70 - -
(83.32)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
All series are detrended and demeaned before testing. * In the group of Central European countries, only
GDP per capita and top 1% income share were included in the test, because there were too few time series
observations per country to include a 4 variable. ** for Anglo-Saxon countries, GDP per capita in constant
Euros was used instead of GDP per capita in purchasing power parities in the test with private consumption.
All variables are tested in logarithms. Bartlett corrected critical values are presented in parentheses. Lag
lengths were selected using Schwarz information criterion.
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Table 5: Panel trace cointegration test for consumption and the top 1% income share
for the 3 country groups
Nordic Central-Europe* Anglo-Saxon**
top 1%
r=0 295.33 294.36 194.75
(167.08) (270.17) (171.47)
r≤1 68.33 72.97 38.86
(51.49) (83.63) (59.64)
top 1%, GDP & interest
r=0 410.85 516.43 1137.26
(381.27) (470.88) (992.44)
r≤1 281.61 194.42 586.90
(267.77) (214.56) (523.78)
r≤2 172.84 - 300.25
(166.60) (336.24)
r≤3 58.99 - -
(89.81)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
All series are detrended and demeaned before testing. * In the group of Central European countries, only
GDP per capita and top 1% income share were included in the test, because there were too few time series
observations per country to include a 4 variable. ** for Anglo-Saxon countries, GDP per capita in constant
Euros was used instead of GDP per capita in purchasing power parities in the test with private consumption.
All variables are tested in logarithms. Bartlett corrected critical values are presented in parentheses. Lag
lengths were selected using Schwarz information criterion.
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time series observations for including four variables. In Central-European countries
the cointegration rank among these three variables is found to be one.
The results of Nordic countries presented above thus indicate that there are two
stationary cointegration relations between gross savings and the top 1% income share
as well as between private consumption and the top 1% income share. In the time
series case this would imply that, in both of these tests, the two variables are I(0)
trend-stationary. However, it does not seem likely that some of these series would
be trend-stationary in Nordic countries, as all of the panel unit root tests found gross
savings, private consumption and the top 1% income share to be I(1) non-stationary
(see section 3.2). If the time series of a variable in three out of nine countries would
be trend-stationary, it would be highly unlikely for the tests to present the series as I(1)
non-stationary.
With panel data, the implications of the cointegration rank test are not so straight-
forward as they are in the case of time series. In model (7), the block matrix elements of
Π are given by Πi j = ΣNk=1αikβ
′
jk, which equal αi jβ
′
j when βi j = 0 for all i , j. However,
if βi j , 0 for i , j, then the block matrix elements of Π are given αi jβ′jk and the rank of
Π can be larger than the number of variables. That is, because the dimension of Π is
Np×Np, the number of cross-sectional cointegration relations may increase the rank
of the matrix. One likely source of cross-sectional cointegration would be a stationary
linear combination of I(1) non-stationary common factor(s) driving the GDP per capita
series in the Nordic countries. As Nordic countries have very similar social structures,
and because they are small countries within close proximity to each other, it would be
quite natural if a common stochastic trend would affect their GDP series. As GDP per
capita and consumption were found to be cointegrated, common stochastic trend driv-
ing the GDP series would also affect on the series of savings and private consumption.
So, the results of the Nordic countries presented in table 5 are likely to be explained by
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cross-sectional cointegration relations affecting the GDP per capita and consumption
series.
In conclusion, results of cointegration tests indicate that income inequality, mea-
sured with the top 1% income share, and private consumption are cointegrated, but the
results of the cointegration tests for gross savings are somewhat inconclusive. It is not
quite clear why this is or why the results deviate from the results of the unit root tests. It
should be noted, however, that in the case of the test of Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre
(2006) we had more than double the number of observations compared to the test of
Larsson and Lyhagen (2007). So, even with the Bartlett correction, it is possible that
the power of Larsson and Lyhagen’s test was not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis
of zero rank of the Π matrix.
5 Estimation
According to the results presented in the previous section, the cointegration rank among
the included variables varies between the groups of countries. Because of this, two dif-
ferent estimation methods are applied to estimate the long-run effect of the income
share of the top 1% on the gross savings and private consumption. Panel dynamic
seemingly unrelated regressors (DSUR) estimator of Mark et al. (2005) is used when
there seems to be only one cointegrating vector between the variables, while the two-
step maximum-likelihood panel VAR estimator by Breitung (2005) is used when there
seem to be two or more cointegrating relations between the variables. The reason for
using panel DSUR estimator is that Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) have found that
single-equation estimators, like panel DSUR, perform better than the VAR estimator
of Breitung (2005), when cross-sections are cross-sectionally correlated and/or coin-
tegrated.12 Both estimators control for possible endogeneity of the regressors. The
12Results of Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) imply that panel DOLS would perform better than panel
VAR by Breitung (2005) in cross-sectionally cointegrated panels. Panel DSUR was not included in testing.
However, as panel DSUR is more efficient than panel DOLS when cross-sections are correlated, it is also
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panel DSUR estimator controls for endogeneity by including lags and leads of first
differences of the explanatory variables in the estimated equation. Panel VAR controls
for endogeneity by imposing block-diagonality of the Fisher information matrix with
respect to short- and long-run parameters. A more detailed explanation of the estima-
tors used can be found in the Appendix. The possible long-run cross-unit dependency
relations in income and consumption series between the Nordic countries found in pre-
vious section cannot be controlled with estimators allowing for short-run dependencies
and/or cross-sectional correlation. Fortunately, Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) have
found that, if there is only a cross-sectionally identical unit-specific cointegrating re-
lationship(s) between the cross-sections, it creates only a small bias in the results of
cointegration estimators used here.
The estimated model is:
log(Yit) = αi +γ′1log(GDPit) +γ
′
2log(top1it) ++γ
′
3(interestit) +λit+uit, (9)
where where αi’s are individual constant, λit’s are individual trends, and uit is a white
noise error vector with E(uit) = 0. Table 6 presents the results of estimation of equation
(9) using the panel DSUR and panel VAR estimators.13 According to the results, the
relation between the top 1% income share and gross savings somewhat depends on the
included variables. The initial estimate of the cointegrating coefficient of inequality
measured with the top 1% income share is negative,14 but the panel VAR estimate
from the model including also the GDP per capita and the interest rate is positive in
all country groups. However, the parameter estimate of the top 1% income share is
statistically significant only in Nordic countries and on the last estimation of the Anglo-
Saxon countries.
Theories describing the relation between income inequality and savings usually
likely to be more efficient than panel DOLS when cross-sections are cointegrated.
13Estimation was conducted with Gauss. Author is grateful to Donggyu Sul and Joerg Breitung for pro-
viding the program codes on their homepages.
14If first equation is estimated with panel VAR, results are similar to those presented in table 6.
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Table 6: Estimates of the long-run elasticity of gross savings with respect to top 1%
income share in 3 groups of countries
Dependent variable: log(gross savings)
Nordics Central-Europe Anglo-Saxon
Panel DSUR (l&l =2)
log(top 1%) -0.0846** -0.127*** -0.4462
(0.0288) (0.0405) (0.3706)
Panel VAR (lags=2;1;1)
log(top 1%) 0.0799*** 0.3794 0.2499
(0.0251) (0.2751) (0.1769)
log(GDP) 0.0118*** 0.0946*** 0.0903***
(0.0015) (0.0100) (0.0108)
Panel VAR (lags=2;1;2)
log(top 1%) 0.5654* 0.1866 0.5385*
(0.2512) (0.2583) (0.1990)
log(GDP) 0.1374*** 0.0894*** 0.0983***
(0.0169) (0.0097) (0.0105)
log(interest) -0.3655** -0.0213 0.0990
(0.1237) (0.0477) (0.0803)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors of the parameter estimates are presented in paren-
theses. Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s Pre-whitening method. Inclusion of
individual constants means that all estimations are made with fixed effects. Lags gives the lag order of
the VAR model. L&l =2 means that first and second leads and lags of first differences of the explanatory
variables are used as instruments.
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Table 7: Estimates of the long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to top
1% income share in 3 groups of countries
Dependent variable: log(private consumption)
Nordic Central-Europe Anglo-Saxon
Panel DSUR (l&l=2)
log(top 1%) -0.1107*** -0.1219*** -0.1260***
(0.0097) (0.0342) (0.0325)
Panel VAR (lags=2;1;2)
log(top 1%) -0.1409** -0.2101*** 0.1130***
(0.0490) (0.0530) (0.0290)
log(GDP) 0.0905*** 0.1002*** 0.0982***
(0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0021)
Panel VAR (lags=1;1;2)
log(top 1%) -0.1349* -0.1748*** 0.0826***
(0.0512) (0.0451) (0.0262)
log(GDP) 0.0919*** 0.0996*** 0.1007***
(0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0021)
log(interest) -0.0132 0.0203 -0.0383***
(0.0262) (0.0120) (0.0108)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors of the parameter estimates are presented in parenthe-
ses. Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s Pre-whitening method. Lags gives the lag
order of the VAR model. Individual constants and trends are included in the regressions. L&l =2 means that
first and second lags and leads of first differences of explanatory variables are used as instruments.
concentrate on household savings behavior, which makes private savings or consump-
tion a more valid measure to assess the effect of inequality on consumption or savings
than gross savings that includes also the government. Table 7 presents the results of
panel DSUR and panel VAR estimations where the dependent variable is private con-
sumption.15 According to the results, the cointegrating coefficient of the GDP per
capita has the expected positive sign in all groups of countries, but the interest rate has
a statistically significant negative effect only in the group of the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. The "blurry" estimate of interest rates in Central-European countries is not a
15Estimation was conducted with Gauss. Author is grateful to Donggyu Sul and Joerg Breitung for pro-
viding the program codes on their homepages.
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surprise as these countries had differing indicators of interest rates. Among the Anglo-
Saxon and Nordic countries, individual countries had the same indicator of interest rate
within each group, but the indicators differed between the groups. In the Anglo-Saxon
countries, the treasury bill rate was used, whereas in the Nordic countries, the central
bank rate was used. Although it is surprising that the interest rate has no statistically
significant effect on the level of private consumption in the Nordic countries, the re-
sult may also be explained by different consumption profiles. Bacchetta and Gerlach
(1997) found that in the United States and Canada, the changes in credit conditions
had a larger impact on consumption than in France or the UK. Humphrey (2004) also
shows that credit cards are used more often as a means of payment in Canada and the
US than in Europe. Thus, it is likely that changes in the interest rates have a greater
effect on private consumption in the Anglo-Saxon than in the European countries.
According to the results of Table 7, the cointegrating coefficient of inequality is
negative in all three country groups when the top 1% income share is the only ex-
planatory variable. However, when the GDP per capita is added as an explanatory
variable, the cointegrating coefficient of inequality changes to positive in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. In the Nordic and Central-European countries the coefficient remains
negative and statistically significant, thus indicating that these results are robust.
As such, the results imply that the long-run elasticity of private consumption with
respect to inequality would be negative in the Nordic and Central-European countries,
but positive in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Although this result is somewhat counter-
intuitive, it is, of course, always possible that the individual saving function is convex
in the European countries and concave in the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, this
contradicts the results of most theories and also some quite recent micro-econometric
evidence from the US stating that propensity to save raises with income (Dynan et al.
2004). From these reasons some reservations need to be attached to the estimation
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results of the Anglo-Saxon countries.16 It is, for example, possible that the cointegra-
tion rank differs among the Anglo-Saxon countries in estimations including the GDP
per capita. In this case, the asymptotic properties of the panel VAR estimator derived
under the assumption of homogenuous cointegration rank are no longer valid. Unfor-
tunately, the time series dimension of individual countries is too small for meaningful
country-specific testing of the cointegration rank. Thus, the ambiguity concerning the
estimation results of the Anglo-Saxon countries has to be left to be addressed in future
studies.
6 Conclusions
In this study we assessed the relationship between income inequality and savings using
a panel of developed economies. We also tested the assumption presented in early the-
oretical literature on income variation that the size distribution of income could follow
a random walk. According to the results, income inequality, measured with the log-
arithmic top 1% income share, logarithmic aggregate savings and logarithmic private
consumption are driven by stochastic trends. The non-stationarity of the logarithmic
top 1% income share implies that the current macroeconomic literature may have taken
an erroneous stand by assuming a stationary process of income variation.
The results concerning cointegration between the top 1% income share and gross
savings were contradictory as the series were found to be cointegrated by both of the
used tests only in the Nordic countries. All tests found the top 1% income share and
private consumption to be cointegrated, which indicates that there is a long-run steady-
state relation between them. The long-run elasticity of private consumption with re-
spect to inequality was found to be negative in the Central-European and Nordic coun-
16To check that this result does not relate to the expansion of credit in the wake of growing inequality, we
added the domestic credit claims on the private sector as an explanatory variable for Anglo-Saxon countries.
The variable was found to be I(1) according to all panel unit root tests mentioned in section three. The
variable was obtained from IMF database. Adding a measure of credit did not change the main results for
Anglo-Saxon countries and it has the expected statistically significant positive effect on private consumption.
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tries, but positive in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This result implies that, in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, the marginal propensity to save would decrease with income, while in
the rest of the countries it would increase. However, estimation results for the Anglo-
Saxon countries crucially depend on the inclusion of the GDP per capita series. When
the GDP per capita was not included in the estimation, the parameter estimate of the
top 1% income share was negative and statistically significant. Thus, it is possible
that the inclusion of the GDP per capita series may introduce some form of bias in the
estimation of Anglo-Saxon countries which cannot be controlled with current panel
estimation methods.
One assumption that needs to be tested in the future is the assumption of homoge-
nous cointegration rank among the Anglo-Saxon countries. If the cointegration rank
has differed among the Anglo-Saxon countries in estimations including the GDP per
capita, the estimates will have been biased. In this study, the individual country cointe-
gration relations could not be tested, because testing would have required considerably
more time series observations than were available in our dataset. For the Nordic and
Central-European countries the observed positive effect of inequality on private savings
seems robust. Estimation results were unchanged when either only the top 1% income
share or the interest rate and the GDP per capita were also included as explanatory vari-
ables. This implies that even if the cointegration rank has differed within the groups
of Nordic and Central-European countries in estimations with additional explanatory
variables, this has not changed the basic results.
So, although the results for the Anglo-Saxon countries are somewhat inconclusive,
the results for the Nordic and Central-European countries clearly indicate that income
inequality leads to higher level of private savings. This result is well in-line with the
theoretical and micro-econometric evidence. It also implies that the controversy sur-
rounding the results of the previous empirical macroeconomic studies has been likely to
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result from miss-specification of the estimated models by assuming stationary income
inequality.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Panel cointegration test by Banerjee and Carrion-I-Silvestre (2006)
Panel cointegration test developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) is
based on the normalized bias and the pseudo t-ratio test statistics by Pedroni (2004).
The data generating process behind Pedroni’s test statistics is given by:
yit = fi(t) + x′it + eit,
4xit = vit,
eit = ρiei,t−1 + itζit = (it,vit)′,
(10)
where fi(t) includes member specific fixed effects and deterministic trends.
The data generating process is described as a partitioned vector z′it ≡ (yit, xit) where
the true process is generated as zit = zi,t−1 +ζit, ζ′it = (ζ
y
itζ
X
it ) (Pedroni 2004).
1√
T
∑[Tr]
t=1 ζit
is assumed to converge to a vector Brownian motion with asymptotic covariance of
Ωi as T −→ ∞. The individual process is assumed to be i.i.d. so that E[ζitζ′js] = 0
∀s, t, i , j.
Let eˆit denote the estimated residuals of obtained from (10) and Ωˆi the consistent
estimator of Ωi. The two test statistics can now be defined as :
Z˜ρˆNT−1 ≡
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where λˆi = 1/T
∑ki
s=1 (1− s/(ki + 1))
∑T
t=s+1 µˆitµˆi,t−s, σ˜
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11iσˆ
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i ≡ 1/t
∑T
t=1 µˆ
∗2
it ,
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i=1 sˆ
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i , Lˆ
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11i = 1/T
∑T
t=1 ϑˆ
2
it+2/T
∑ki
s=1 (1− s/(k− i+ 1))
∑T
t=s+1 ϑˆi, ϑˆi,t−s. The
residuals µˆit, µˆ∗it and ϑˆit are attained from regressions: eˆit = γˆeˆi,t−1 + µˆit, eˆit = γˆieˆi,t−1 +∑K−i
k=1 γˆik∆eˆi,t−k + µˆ
∗
it, ∆yit =
∑M
m=1 bˆmi∆xmi,t = ϑˆit. (Pedroni 1999, 2004)
The statistics pool the between dimension of the panel and they are constructed by
computing the ratio of the corresponding conventional time series statistics and then
by computing the standardized sum of the N time series of the panel. Pedroni (1999,
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2004) shows that under the null of no cointegration the asymptotic distributions of the
two statistics presented above converge to normal distributions with zero mean and
variance of one as N and T sequentially converge to infinity.
Banerjee and Carrion-I-Silvestre (2006) extend the model by Pedroni (2004) to
include common factors:
yi,t = fi(t) + x′i,t +ui,t,
4xi,t = vi,t,
fi(t) = µi +βit
uit = F′tpii + eit
(11)
where ei,t = ρiei,t + i,t and F′t :s are the common factors which are used to account for
the possible cross-sectional dependence.
APPENDIX B: Panel trace cointegration test statistic by Larsson and Lyhagen
(2007)
The trace cointegration test by Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) is based on the follow-
ing model:
4Yt = µ+ΠYt−1 +Σm−1k=1 Γk∆Yt−k + t, (12)
where µ = (µ′1,µ
′
2, ...,µ
′
N)
′, t = (′1t, 
′
2t, ..., 
′
nt), Yt−1 and ∆Yt−k are of order Np× 1, Π
and Γk are Np× Np, and t is assumed to be multivariate normally distributed with
mean zero and covariance matrix Ωi j.
It is assumed that matrix Π has a reduced rank of Nr, 0 ≤ r ≤ p, which is specified
as Π = αikβ′k j (Larsson and Lyhagen 2007). Matrices α and β are both order of Np×Nr
and the former contains the short-run coefficient and the latter the long-run coefficient.
In β, βii ≡ βi for each rank of r. Because of the restriction, βk j = 0 ∀i , j, the block
matrix elements of Π are given by ΣNk=1αikβ
′
k j = αi jβ
′
j.
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The cointegration rank is estimated by sequentially testing
H(r) : rank(Π) ≤ Nr (13)
against the alternative
H(p) : rank(Π) ≤ Np, (14)
which is the same method as in Johansen (1995).
Define QT as the maximum likelihood ratio test statistic for the test of H(r) against
H(p), and assume that the matrix α′ ⊥ Γβ ⊥ has a full rank and that the roots of the
characteristic polynomial
A(z) = (1− z)INp−αβ′z−Σm−1i=1 Γk(1− z)zi (15)
lie outside the complex unit circle. Now, if r > 0,
-2 log Qt
w−→ U +V, (16)
as T −→∞, where V is χ2 with N(N−1)r(p− r) degrees of freedom independent of U,
and
U = tr

∫
dBF′
(∫
FF′
)−1 ∫
FdB′
 . (17)
Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) show that the limit distribution of the test statistic (16)
equals the convolution of Dickey-Fuller distribution (B) and an independent χ2 variate
(F). The distribution can be simulated by approximating the Wiener process of B by a
random walk.
APPENDIX C: Panel DSUR and panel VAR estimators
The data generation process in Mark et al. (2005) DSUR estimator is of the form
yit = αi +λit+ θt +β′xit +uit, (18)
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4xit = eit (19)
where there are n cointegrating regression each with T observations, (1− β′) is the
cointegration vector between yit and xit, and xit and eit are k× 1 dimensional vectors.
Panel DSUR eliminates the possible endogeneity between explanatory variables and
the dependent variable by assuming that uit is correlated at most with pi leads and lags
of 4xit (Mark et al. 2005). The possible endogeneity can be controlled by projecting
uit onto these pi leads and lags:
uit =
pi∑
s=−pi
δ′i,s4xi,t−s +uit∗ = δ′izit +u∗it. (20)
The projection error u∗it is orthogonal to all leads and lags of 4xit and the estimated
equation becomes:
yit = αi +λit + θt +β′xit +δizit +u∗it, (21)
where δ′izit is a vector of projection dimensions. Panel DSUR estimates a long-run co-
variance matrix that is used in estimation of equation (18). This makes panel DSUR
more efficient when cross-sections are dependent. The efficiency of panel DSUR actu-
ally improves as the correlation between cross-sections increases. Asymptotics prop-
erties of the estimator are based on T −→∞ with N fixed.
Breitung (2005) proposes a panel VAR(p) model which can be presented as a panel
vector error-correction model (VECM) as
4yit = ψidt +αiβ′y,t−1 +Σp−1j=1 Γi j4 yi,t− j + it, (22)
where dt is a vector of deterministic variables and ψi a k× k matrix of unknown coef-
ficients, Γi j is unrestricted matrix, and it is a white noise error vector with E(it) = 0
and positive definite covariance matrix Σi = E(it′it). The model is estimated in two
stages. First, the models are estimated separately across N cross-section units. Then
cointegration vectors are normalized so that they do not depend on individual specific
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parameters. Second, the system is transformed to a pooled regression of the form:
zˆit = β′yi,t−1 + vˆit, (23)
where zˆit = (αˆ′i Σˆ
−1
i αˆi)
−1αˆ′i Σˆ
−1
i 4 yit and vˆit is defined in similar fashion. The cointegra-
tion matrix, β, can now be estimated from (23) using the OLS estimator. It is assumed
that the statistical units included in the panel have the same cointegration rank. Consis-
tent estimation is based on sequential limits. Cross-sectional correlation is accounted
by using an estimated asymptotic covariance matrix.
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